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Abstract 
 
In this research, the relationship between corporate governance and financial management decisions such as earnings 
management and inappropriate investments is explored. Data of 110 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange market from 
2007 to 2013 has been used. The method for testing the hypotheses was linear regression. The results showed a negative and 
meaningful relationship between ownership concentration and CEO duality with earnings management. Institutional ownership 
has a positive and meaningful relationship with earnings management. Management ownership and earnings management 
have no meaningful relationship. Also, other results show that management ownership has a negative and meaningful 
relationship with investment efficiency and other corporate governance mechanisms have no meaningful relationship with 
investment efficiency. 
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 Introduction 1.
 
Corporate governance in recent years has appealed to many people. This is due to the attention paid to economic health 
of the society and specifically commercial units. Especially that extreme increase in corporate frauds and consequent 
scandals of their discovery in recent decades has emphasized the necessity of using enterprise management system 
mechanisms. Corporate governance system as a system connecting different scientific branches such as accounting, 
financial management, economy and law and with maintaining balance of social and economic goals with individual and 
group goals leads to encouragement and enhancement of efficient and optimal use of resources and accountability of 
companies in regard to other stakeholders in the company. On the other hand, implementation of corporate governance 
system can help optimal specialization of resources and improvement of financial information transparency in the market 
and consequently economic development (John and Senbet, 1998, quoted in Ghaemi and Shahriari, 2009; 114). The 
ultimate goal of corporate governance is reaching responsibility, transparency, justice and respecting stakeholders’ rights 
in firms. Among these, accountability is the essence of corporate governance and its proper implementation will facilitate 
reaching the other three goals (Hasas Yegane,2006;34). 
 
 Literature Review 2.
 
Rahbary Kharazi (2005), by exploring the conditions of corporate governance in firms listed in Iran Stock Exchange 
Market and comparing them with world countries, has studied shareholders’ rights. The results revealed that 
shareholders’ rights are not respected in Iran. 
Yazdanian (2006) has investigated the impact of several criteria of corporate governance on the decrease in 
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earnings management. He found out that only the presence of institutional shareholders affects the decrease in earnings 
management, while the presence of external members of board of directors, segregation of CEO and chairman’s role and 
also presence of internal auditor does not influence earnings management. 
Hasas Yeganeh et. Al, (2008) examined the relationship between institutional investors and firm value. They used 
multiple linear regressions for testing their research hypothesis. The results confirmed the existence of a positive 
relationship between institutional investors and firm value. 
By examining the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management in Tehran exchange 
market companies, Hasas Yegane et. Al, (2008) realized that there is no meaningful relationship between these 
mechanisms, including the number of board of directors’ members, number and efficiency of external managers, 
segregation of CEO and chairman duties or his/her membership in the board of directors, ownership structure and 
existence of internal audit. 
Zhou and Wang (1999) studied the relationship between ownership structure and corporate governance in China 
stock market. Findings demonstrated that institutional investors have a positive effect on the profitability. Many of the 
research done in the field of  corporate governance mechanisms in companies emphasize this fact that weakness in 
corporate governance mechanisms in a firm is related to low quality of financial statements report, income and earnings 
fraud and manipulation and also low information transparency (Beasley et. Al, 2000,    Carsello and Neal, 2000; Fellow et 
al., 2001 ).  
Yermack (2004) with a population of 452 companies from 1991-2003, showed that when CEO and chairman are 
different, firm has more value. 
Gonzalez and Mocha (2014), in their research, investigated the impact of corporate governance strategies on 
earnings management in Latin American countries. Results of the research showed that ownership concentration has 
negative and meaningful and management ownership has positive and meaningful impact on firm earnings. Furthermore, 
other results of their research showed that corporate management mechanisms lack proper efficiency and productivity for 
improving performance and operation of the firms under study. 
Avvgbh and Peter (2014) explored the impacts of corporate governance strategies on earnings management in 
Nigeria Stock Exchange Market. They realized that the variables of CEO task duality and institutional shareholders’ 
percentage have negative and meaningful relationship with earnings management. 
In another research, Panayides and Andreo (2014) explored the correlation between corporate governance and 
financial management decisions such as unpleasant investments and profit management in marine companies. Findings 
revealed the relationship between corporate governance and financial management decisions. In this study, the variables 
of the size of board of directors, internal management ownership, presence of corporate supervision committees and 
CEO task duality were examined. 
Results of their project also demonstrated that there is a negative correlation between variables such as the size 
and independence of board of directors with profit management.  
 
 Research Hypotheses 3.
 
First hypothesis: There is a meaningful relationship between ownership management and firms’ earnings management. 
Second hypothesis: There is a meaningful relationship between the percentage of institutional shareholders and 
earnings management. 
Third hypothesis: There is a meaningful relationship between the percentage of block shareholders and earnings 
management. 
Fourth hypothesis: There is a meaningful relationship between CEO task duality and earnings management. 
Fifth hypothesis: There is a meaningful relationship between management ownership and investment efficiency. 
Sixth hypothesis: There is a meaningful relationship between the percentage of institutional shareholders and 
investment efficiency. 
Seventh hypothesis: There is a meaningful relationship between the percentage of block shareholders and 
investment efficiency. 
Eighth hypothesis: There is a meaningful relationship between the CEO task duality and investment efficiency. 
 
 Research Methodology 4.
 
Statistical population 
Research population of the current study consists of all firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange Market in a 7-year 
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period from 2007 to 2013. In this research, among all the companies, those which lacked any of the following 
requirements were omitted and eventually all the remaining firms were selected for performing the test. 
• Companies should own full information for all financial statements such as balance sheet, cash flow 
statements, and income statement. 
• Their financial year should end in Esfand 29th. 
• Companies should be active in stock exchange market during research period. 
• They shouldn’t change their financial year during research. 
• Company should not be of investment or financial intermediary type. 
Based on the stated limitations, 110 companies were selected and investigated as statistical population in the 
present research. 
 
 Method of Data Collection and Analysis 5.
 
Data collection was done in 2 stages in this research. In the first stage, for formulation of theoretical foundation of 
research, library method and for the second stage, for data collection, sample companies’ documents and papers, such 
as financial statements in CDs presented by Tehran Stock Exchange and Research, Development and Islamic Studies 
Management of Stock Exchange (http://rdis.ir) have been used. Analysis of data and test of hypotheses were done 
through linear regression and Eviews software.  
For analyzing each of the hypotheses, cross-sectional and compositional data were used. Also, for analysis of 
research hypotheses, we relied on the findings related to model estimation at compositional data level. Moreover, in order 
to examine the hypotheses test results, T-test for meaningfulness of coefficients and F-test for meaningfulness of the 
whole model were used and also, 12 adjusted R2 was used for the relationship between dependent and independent 
variables. 
 
 Variables and Research Model 6.
 
Independent Variable 
Corporate governance that is measured by the following criteria: 
o The percentage of company shares that are held by board of directors. 
o The percentage of company shares that are held by institutional shareholders. (institutional shareholders 
involve all legal shareholders) 
o The number of block shareholders whose ownership percentage is more than 5 percent of company shares. 
o Duality of CEO tasks; that is when CEO is the same as chairman of board of directors.  
Dependent Variable 
1. Earnings management that is calculated through modified Jones model (1991). 
ܶܣ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶ൫ο݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜ǡ௧ െ οܣܴ௜௧൯ ൅ ߙଷܲܲܧ௜௧ ൅ ߙସܤܯ௜௧ ൅ ߙହܥܨ ௜ܱ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧  
TA: Total accruals of the firm that is calculated by difference of before extraordinary items earnings and operating 
cash flow. 
ο݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜ǡ௧= changes in sales from last year to current year 
οܣܴ௜௧= accounts receivable difference from last to current year. 
ܲܲܧ௜௧= fixed assets 
BM  = book value of ordinary shares to ordinary shares market 
ܥܨ ௜ܱ௧= company operating cash flow 
Modified Jones model remainder shows firm earnings management; the bigger the remaining modulus, there is a 
higher possibility of firm earnings management and if the model’s remaining modulus is smaller and close to zero, the 
possibility of firm earnings management is lower. 
2. Investment Efficiency: 
This variable signifies lack of overinvestment and underinvestment based on financial manager decisions and 
it is calculated by the remainder of following model, which was developed by Richardson (2006): 
ܫܧ௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶܳ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܣܩܧ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙସܵܫܼܧ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙହܮܧ ௧ܸିଵ ൅ ߙ଺ܥܣܵܪ௧ିଵ ൅ߝ௧  
IE = net investment expenses 
Q= Firm Tobin’s Q 
AGE= Firm age 
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SIZE=Firm size 
LEV=Firm leverage 
CASH=firm cash 
Control variable 
Firm size: this criterion is obtained through natural logarithm of total assets 
Financial leverage: it is calculated through division of total debts to total assets 
In the current project, the relationship between corporate governance and decisions of financial managers of firms 
listed in Tehran Exchange Market is tested. Research regression models are as follows: 
Pattern 1:  
ܦܣ௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶܦܷܣܮ௜௧ ൅ ߙଷܥܱܱ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ߙସܫܰ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߙହܯܩ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧ ൅ ܴܱܣ௜௧ ൅ܵܫܼܧ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௧  
This model is used for testing hypotheses one to four. 
Pattern 2 
̴ܴܫܧ௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶܦܷܣܮ௜௧ ൅ ߙଷܥܱܱ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ߙସܫܰ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߙହܯܩ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧ ൅ ܴܱܣ௜௧ ൅ܵܫܼܧ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௧  
This model is used for testing hypotheses five to eight. 
 
 Research Findings 7.
 
Results of table.1 demonstrate that Tobin’s Q dependant variables’ average equals (1.4221), average accruals (0.1391) 
and average investment is (0.5616). Moreover, based on pattern 1, average value for block and institutional shareholders 
and management’ ownership structures is 0.7587, 0.7198 and 0.6734 ,respectively that implies the fact that a limited 
number of institutional are members of the board of directors and are able to lead firm decisions. Also, Standard 
deviation, kurtosis and skewness statistics (presented in the appendix) can be used for exploring normal distribution of 
data (Claire and Varak, 2003). Examining the foresaid criteria, it can be said that the data related to independent and 
dependant variables have normal distribution, because variables have the least difference from the presented value for 
kurtosis. Vovs (2002) states that when the size of a sample is bigger than 100 (an approximate criterion for normal 
distribution) increases the possibility of normal data. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Minimum maximum Standard deviationmeanaveragenumberVariable 
0.3227 4.60150.59191.23621.4221741Tobin’s Q 
0.0395 0.99980.17990.80800.758741Ownership concentration
0.0000 1.00000.28501.00000.9109741CEO duality 
0.0100 0.99000.26870.81730.7195741Institutional ownership
0.0100 0.99000.19620.69800.6734741Management ownership
0.0964 0.97140.16730.65760.6523741Financial leverage
-1.3856 2.93580.55140.39450.5300741Return on assets 
4.2464 7.95680.59185.68085.7298741Firm size 
0.2173 3.09790.25060.80890.7946741Book-to-market value ration
-7.1403 4.42940.63960.05320.1391741Accruals 
6.0000 57.00000.588636.000033.2361741Firm size 
0.0005 3.797412.07380.46180.8616741Investments expenses
0.0556 0.97780.25560.05560.1810741Cash 
 
 Results of Testing Hypotheses 8.
 
Table.2 shows the results of assessing research model 1. For this model Durbin-Watson Statistic equals 1.786 and the 
error term is rejected at 5 error level. The possibility value related to F statistic is less than 5 percent for specification. 
This way, null hypothesis based on model specification error is rejected. As a result, meaningfulness of the model is 
accepted with 95percent certainty. Adjusted R-square equals 0.31. This test reflects that about 31 percent of dependent 
variable changes can be described by independent variables. Since model test was not rejected, research hypotheses 
are investigated. 
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Table 2. Results of assessing research model 1 
 
Error level t-statisticCoefficientVariable 
0.1864-1.3225-0.1060y-intercept
0.0000-4.0985-0.3399Ownership concentration
0.0211-2.3113-0.0637CEO duality
0.00023.80590.1603Institutional ownership
0.34200.95070.0620management ownership
0.00007.37950.3260Financial leverage
0.000018.10130.4367Return on assets
0.0055-2.7856-0.0337Firm size
  0.3189 R-square
  0.3125Adjusted R-square
  1.7868Durbin-Watson Statistic
  50.1707F Statistic
  0.0000F Statistic Possibility
 
Hypothesis No. 1 
The purpose of this hypothesis is investigating the existence of a meaningful relationship between block 
shareholders percentage (ownership concentration) and earnings management. Therefore, null and alternative statistical 
hypotheses are as follows: 
Null hypothesis: there is not a meaningful relationship between block shareholders’ percentage (ownership 
concentration) and earnings management.  
Hypothesis: there is a meaningful relationship between block shareholders’ percentage (ownership concentration) 
and earnings management.  
According to the results presented in table 2, possibility error level related to null hypothesis is based on the lack of 
meaningful impact of ownership concentration on earnings management is 0.0000 that is smaller than 0.05. Hence, null 
hypothesis is rejected. Consequently, ownership concentration has a meaningful and negative relationship with earnings 
management.  
Hypothesis No. 2 
The goal of this hypothesis is to explore if there is a meaningful relationship between CEO task duality and earning 
management. Therefore, statistical null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
Null hypothesis: There is no meaningful relationship between CEO task duality and earnings management. 
Alternative hypothesis: there is a meaningful relationship between CEO task duality and earnings management. 
According to the findings presented in table 2, possible error rate of null hypothesis based on the lack of 
meaningful impact of CEO duality on financial performance equals 0.0211 that is smaller than 0.05. Hence, null 
hypothesis is rejected. As a result, CEO duality has a meaningful and negative impact on earnings management. 
Hypothesis No. 3 
The goal of this hypothesis is to explore if there is a meaningful relationship between institutional ownership and 
earnings management. 
Therefore, statistical null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
Null hypothesis: There is no meaningful relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management. 
Alternative hypothesis: there is a meaningful relationship between institutional ownership and earnings 
management. 
According to the findings presented in table 2, possible error rate of null hypothesis based on the lack of 
meaningful impact of institutional ownership on  earnings management equals 0.0002 that is smaller than 0.05. Hence, 
null hypothesis is rejected. As a result, institutional ownership has a meaningful impact on earnings management. 
Hypothesis No. 4 
The goal of this hypothesis is to explore if there is a meaningful relationship between management ownership and 
earnings management. Therefore, statistical null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
Null hypothesis: There is no meaningful relationship between management ownership and earnings management. 
Alternative hypothesis: there is a meaningful relationship between management ownership and earnings 
management. 
According to the findings presented in table 2, possible error rate of null hypothesis based on the lack of 
meaningful impact of institutional ownership on earnings management equals 0.3420 that is bigger than 0.05. Hence, null 
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hypothesis is not rejected. As a result, institutional ownership has no meaningful impact on earnings management. 
Table.3 shows the results of assessing research model 2. For this model Durbin-Watson Statistic equals 2.3112 
and the error term is rejected at 5 error level. The possibility value related to F statistic is less than 5 percent for 
specification. This way, null hypothesis based on model specification error is rejected. As a result, meaningfulness of the 
model is accepted with 95percent certainty. Adjusted R-square equals 0.2185 .This test reflects that about 22 percent of 
dependent variable changes can be described by independent variables. Since model statistic was not rejected, research 
hypotheses are investigated. 
 
Table 3. Results of assessing research model 2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis No. 5 
The goal of this hypothesis is to explore if there is a meaningful relationship between the ownership percentage of 
block shareholders (ownership concentration) and investment efficiency. Therefore, statistical null and alternative 
hypotheses are as follows: 
Null hypothesis: There is no meaningful relationship between the ownership percentage of block shareholders 
(ownership concentration) and investment efficiency. 
Alternative hypothesis: There is a meaningful relationship between the ownership percentage of block 
shareholders (ownership concentration) and investment efficiency. 
According to the findings presented in table 3, possible error rate of null hypothesis based on the lack of 
meaningful impact of ownership percentage of block shareholders (ownership concentration) and  investment efficiency 
equals 0.6535 that is bigger than 0.05. Hence, null hypothesis is not rejected. As a result, ownership concentration has 
no meaningful impact on earnings investment efficiency. 
Hypothesis No. 6 
The goal of this hypothesis is to explore if there is a meaningful relationship between CEO task duality and 
investment efficiency. Therefore, statistical null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
Null hypothesis: There is no meaningful relationship between CEO task duality and investment efficiency. 
Alternative hypothesis: there is a meaningful relationship between CEO task duality and investment efficiency. 
According to the findings presented in table 3, possible error rate of null hypothesis based on the lack of 
meaningful impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency equals 0.3034 that is bigger than 0.05. Hence, null hypothesis 
is not rejected. As a result, CEO duality does not have a meaningful impact on investment efficiency. 
Hypothesis No. 7 
The goal of this hypothesis is to explore if there is a meaningful relationship between institutional ownership and 
investment efficiency. Therefore, statistical null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
Null hypothesis: There is no meaningful relationship between institutional ownership and investment efficiency. 
Alternative hypothesis: there is a meaningful relationship between institutional ownership and investment 
efficiency. 
According to the findings presented in table 3, possible error rate of null hypothesis based on the lack of 
meaningful impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency equals 0.4167 that is bigger than 0.05. Hence, null hypothesis 
Error level t-statisticCoefficientVariable 
0.4292 0.79100.2241y-intercept
0.6535 -0.4491-0.0700Ownership concentration
0.30334 1.03000.0445CEO duality
0.4167 -0.81270.1859Institutional ownership
0.0342 -2.1221-0.3387management ownership
0.2990 1.03940.1353Financial leverage
0.7021 -0.38260.0190Return on assets
0.5310 62670.0134Firm size
  0.3383R-square
  0.2185 Adjusted R-square
  2.3112Durbin-Watson Statistic
  2.8252F Statistic
  0.0000F Statistic Possibility
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is not rejected. As a result, CEO duality does not have a meaningful impact on investment efficiency. 
Hypothesis No. 8 
The goal of this hypothesis is to explore if there is a meaningful relationship between management ownership and 
investment efficiency. Therefore, statistical null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
Null hypothesis: There is no meaningful relationship between management ownership and investment efficiency. 
Alternative hypothesis: there is a meaningful relationship between management ownership and investment 
efficiency. 
According to the findings presented in table 3, possible error rate of null hypothesis based on the lack of 
meaningful impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency equals 0.0342 that is smaller than 0.05. Hence, null 
hypothesis is rejected. As a result, management ownership has a meaningful and negative impact on investment 
efficiency. 
 
 Conclusion 9.
 
In this research, the relationship between corporate governance including ownership concentration, institutional 
ownership and board of directors’ task duality in regard to financial management’s decisions was studied. Two criteria for 
financial management decisions were used in this research that consist of profit management and investment efficiency, 
and in this respect, the study is similar to that of Panayiotis et al. (2015). Although some of the used variables for 
measuring the two criteria and also broader range of the companies selected are the points of difference. As it was 
mentioned, one of the measuring criteria for financial management decisions in this research is profit management. 
Therefore, this project showed there is a negative and significant correlation between ownership concentration and CEO 
duality with profit management that is consistent with Avvgubh and Peter (2014)’s research and also institutional 
ownership has a meaningful and positive relationship with profit management that is consistent with Yazdanian research.  
Moreover, the results revealed that management ownership do not have meaningful relationship with profit management 
that is similar to the findings of Hasas Yeganeh et al.,and there is a negative and significant relationship between other 
corporate governance mechanisms with investment efficiency. Other corporate governance mechanisms do not have any 
significant relationship with investment coefficient. 
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